meme

criticism of meme theory

an objection to the study of the evolution of memes in genetic terms (although not to the existence of memes) involves a perceived gap in the gene/meme analogy: the cumulative evolution of genes depends on biological selection-pressures neither too great nor too small in relation to mutation-rates. there seems no reason to think that the same balance will exist in the selection pressures on memes.[21]
luis benitez-bribiesca m.d., a critic of memetics, calls the theory a "pseudoscientific dogma" and "a dangerous idea that poses a threat to the serious study of consciousness and cultural evolution". as a factual criticism, benitez-bribiesca points to the lack of a "code script" for memes (analogous to the dna of genes), and to the excessive instability of the meme mutation mechanism (that of an idea going from one brain to another), which would lead to a low replication accuracy and a high mutation rate, rendering the evolutionary process chaotic.[22]
another critique comes from semiotic theorists such as deacon[23] and kull[24] this view regards the concept of "meme" as a primitivized concept of "sign". the meme is thus described[by whom?] in memetics as a sign lacking a triadic nature. semioticians can regard a meme as a "degenerate" sign, which includes only its ability of being copied. accordingly, in the broadest sense, the objects of copying are memes, whereas the objects of translation and interpretation are signs.[clarification needed]
fracchia and lewontin regard memetics as reductionist and inadequate.[25]
[edit]potential lack of philosophical depth
in his chapter titled "truth" published in the encyclopedia of phenomenology, dieter lohmar questions the memeticists' reduction of the highly complex body of ideas (such as religion, politics, war, justice, and science itself) to a putatively one-dimensional series of memes. he sees memes as an abstraction and such a reduction as failing to produce greater understanding of those ideas. the highly interconnected, multi-layering of ideas resists memetic simplification to an atomic or molecular form; as does the fact that each of our lives remains fully enmeshed and involved in such "memes". lohmar argues that one cannot view memes through a microscope in the way one can detect genes. the leveling-off of all such interesting "memes" down to some neutralized molecular "substance" such as "meme-substance" introduces a bias toward scientism and abandons the very essence of what makes ideas interesting, richly available, and worth studying.[26]
[edit]applications
opinions differ as to how best to apply the concept of memes within a "proper" disciplinary framework. one view sees memes as providing a useful philosophical perspective with which to examine cultural evolution. proponents of this view (such as susan blackmore and daniel dennett) argue that considering cultural developments from a meme's-eye view—as if memes themselves respond to pressure to maximise their own replication and survival—can lead to useful insights and yield valuable predictions into how culture develops over time. others such as bruce edmonds and robert aunger have focused on the need to provide an empirical grounding for memetics to become a useful and respected scientific discipline.[27][28] a third approach, described[by whom?] as "radical memetics", seeks to place memes at the centre of a materialistic theory of mind and of personal identity.[29]
prominent researchers in evolutionary psychology and anthropology, including scott atran, dan sperber, pascal boyer, john tooby and others, argue the possibility of incompatibility between modularity of mind and memetics.[citation needed] in their view, minds structure certain communicable aspects of the ideas produced, and these communicable aspects generally trigger or elicit ideas in other minds through inference (to relatively rich structures generated from often low-fidelity input) and not high-fidelity replication or imitation. atran discusses communication involving religious beliefs as a case in point. in one set of experiments he asked religious people to write down on a piece of paper the meanings of the ten commandments. despite the subjects' own expectations of consensus, interpretations of the commandments showed wide ranges of variation, with little evidence of consensus. in another experiment, subjects with autism and subjects without autism interpreted ideological and religious sayings (for example, "let a thousand flowers bloom" or "to everything there is a season"). people with autism showed a significant tendency to closely paraphrase and repeat content from the original statement (for example: "don't cut flowers before they bloom"). controls tended to infer a wider range of cultural meanings with little replicated content (for example: "go with the flow" or "everyone should have equal opportunity"). only the subjects with autism—who lack the degree of inferential capacity normally associated with aspects of theory of mind—came close to functioning as "meme machines".[30]
in his book the robot's rebellion, stanovich uses the memes and memeplex concepts to describe a program of cognitive reform that he refers to as a "rebellion". specifically, stanovich argues that the use of memes as a descriptor for cultural units is beneficial because it serves to emphasize transmission and acquisition properties that parallel the study of epidemiology. these properties make salient the sometimes parasitic nature of acquired memes, and as a result individuals should be motivated to reflectively acquire memes using what he calls a "neurathian bootstrap" process.[31]
[edit]religion

see also: evolutionary psychology of religion
although social scientists such as max weber sought to understand and explain religion in terms of a cultural attribute, richard dawkins called for a re-analysis of religion in terms of the evolution of self-replicating ideas apart from any resulting biological advantages they might bestow.
as an enthusiastic darwinian, i have been dissatisfied with explanations that my fellow-enthusiasts have offered for human behaviour. they have tried to look for 'biological advantages' in various attributes of human civilization. for instance, tribal religion has been seen as a mechanism for solidifying group identity, valuable for a pack-hunting species whose individuals rely on cooperation to catch large and fast prey. frequently the evolutionary preconception in terms of which such theories are framed is implicitly group-selectionist, but it is possible to rephrase the theories in terms of orthodox gene selection.
—richard dawkins, the selfish gene
he argued that the role of key replicator in cultural evolution belongs not to genes, but to memes replicating thought from person to person by means of imitation. these replicators respond to selective pressures that may or may not affect biological reproduction or survival.[6]
in her book the meme machine, susan blackmore regards religions as particularly tenacious memes. many of the features common to the most widely practiced religions provide built-in advantages in an evolutionary context, she writes. for example, religions that preach of the value of faith over evidence from everyday experience or reason inoculate societies against many of the most basic tools people commonly use to evaluate their ideas. by linking altruism with religious affiliation, religious memes can proliferate more quickly because people perceive that they can reap societal as well as personal rewards. the longevity of religious memes improves with their documentation in revered religious texts.[12]
aaron lynch attributed the robustness of religious memes in human culture to the fact that such memes incorporate multiple modes of meme transmission. religious memes pass down the generations from parent to child and across a single generation through the meme-exchange of proselytism. most people will hold the religion taught them by their parents throughout their life. many religions feature adversarial elements, punishing apostasy, for instance, or demonizing infidels. in thought contagion lynch identifies the memes of transmission in christianity as especially powerful in scope. believers view the conversion of non-believers both as a religious duty and as an act of altruism. the promise of heaven to believers and threat of hell to non-believers provide a strong incentive for members to retain their belief. lynch asserts that belief in the crucifixion of jesus in christianity amplifies each of its other replication advantages through the indebtedness believers have to their savior for sacrifice on the cross. the image of the crucifixion recurs in religious sacraments, and the proliferation of symbols of the cross in homes and churches potently reinforces the wide array of christian memes.[15]
[edit]memetic explanations of racism

in cultural software: a theory of ideology, jack balkin argued that memetic processes can explain many of the most familiar features of ideological thought. his theory of "cultural software" maintained that memes form narratives, networks of cultural associations, metaphoric and metonymic models, and a variety of different mental structures. balkin maintains that the same structures used to generate ideas about free speech or free markets also serve to generate racist beliefs. to balkin, whether memes become harmful or maladaptive depends on the environmental context in which they exist rather than in any special source or manner to their origination. balkin describes racist beliefs as "fantasy" memes that become harmful or unjust "ideologies" when diverse peoples come together, as through trade or competition.[32]
[edit]internet culture